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BANKRUPTCY LIEN 
INVALIDATION: ROLE OF 
RECORDATION 
DAVID G. EPSTEIN* 
Congress is currently considering new bankruptcy legisla-
tion. To date, its focus has been on two bills, one prepared by 
the National Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, 1 the other by 
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. 2 Both bills call 
for substantial changes in present bankruptcy practices. Af-
firmative action on some combination of the two now seems 
likely. It appears that Congress soon will, for the first time in 
77 years, comprehensively revise bankruptcy law. Accordingly, 
this is an appropriate time to examine closely basic bankruptcy 
concepts and policies. This article will deal with one very spe-
cific topic: the effect of recordation on lien invalidation under 
present bankruptcy law and under the proposed acts. 
I. PRESENT LA w 
"[B]ankruptcy is one of those words, like 'war', that you 
have heard all your life and think that you understand until 
you actually become involved with the process the word is in-
tended to identify."3 Bankruptcy is a federal creditors' remedy 
and debtors' relief provision. There are presently several forms 
of bankruptcy proceedings. 4 The overwhelming majority of 
bankruptcy proceedings are "straight bankruptcy" and most 
laymen and all too many lawyers use the terms "bankruptcy" 
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; J.D., 1966, University of 
Texas; LL.M., 1969, Harvard. Member of the State Bar of Texas and the State Bar of 
Arizona. 
1. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. The companion bill in the Senate in S. 236. J'his 
will be referred to hereafter as the Commission's Bill in the text and (Commission) in 
the footnotes. 
2. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. The companion bill in the Senate is S.235. This 
will be referred to hereafter as the Judges' Bill in the text and as (Judges) in footnotes. 
3. J.WEIDMAN, FOURTH STREET EAST 219 (1970). 
4. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1973). 
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and "straight bankruptcy" interchangeably. Straight bank-
ruptcy is in the nature of a liquidation proceeding and involves 
the collection and distribution to creditors of all the bankrupt's 
nonexempt property by the bankruptcy trustee in the manner 
provided in the Bankruptcy Act. As part of the proceedings, the 
bankrupt is discharged from all of his "provable" debts absent 
the application of one of the exclusions from discharge set out 
in section 145 of the Act or exceptions from discharge set out 
in section 17. 
Straight bankruptcy proceedings may be instituted volun-
tarily by the debtor or involuntarily by creditor action. Volun-
tary bankruptcies outnumber involuntary bankruptcies by 
more than one hundred to one. Voluntary straight bankruptcy 
is available to most individuals and businesses.6 The solvency 
of the petitioner is immaterial, as is the amount of his liabili-
ties, so long as he has debts. 
While any person eligible under section 4a may, with few 
requirements, file a voluntary petition and be automatically 
adjudicated bankrupt, the situation in an involuntary proceed-
ing is somewhat more complicated.7 Adjudication upon an in-
voluntary petition is dependent upon satisfaction of the follow-
ing conditions: 
(1) The debtor owes debts of $1,000 or more; 
(2) The debtor is not within one of the three classes of 
persons eligible for voluntary bankruptcy protected by section 
4b from an involuntary petition; 
(3) The petition is filed or joined by a sufficient number 
of qualified creditors;8 
(4) The bankrupt has committed one of the six acts of 
bankruptcy enumerated in section 3a; 
(5) The petition must be filed within four months of the 
commission of the act of bankruptcy; 
5. The Bankruptcy Act is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. Section 
numbers in Title 11 do not correspond to the more commonly used section numbers of 
the Act. All references in this article are to Bankruptcy Act section numbers. 
6. See Bankruptcy Act § 4. 
7. Id. § 4b. 
8. See Bankruptcy Act§ 59. 
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(6) The debtor is properly served with the petition and 
defaults or is adjudicated bankrupt after a trial. 
After adjudication, the procedure in an involuntary 
straight bankruptcy proceeding is the same as in voluntary 
proceedings. The bankruptcy judge calls a first meeting of 
creditors and sends notice to all creditors scheduled by the 
bankrupt. An important feature of the first meeting of creditors 
is the selection of the trustee. The trustee is the representative 
of the creditors, and the Bankruptcy Act provides for selection 
of a trustee by creditors. While the bankruptcy judge super-
vises the task of collection and distribution of the bankrupt's 
estate, the actual job of collection and distribution is the trus-
tee's. 
A valid lien is particularly important to a creditor when 
the debtor is bankrupt.9 All creditors do not participate equally 
in the distribution. A creditor with a valid lien is paid first to 
the extent of the value of the property subject to the lien. Then, 
creditors entitled to priority under section 64 of the Bankruptcy 
Act are paid. Then, a pro rate distribution is made to the 
general creditors. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the practical signifi-
cance of a valid lien in straight bankruptcy. B files a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition. At the time of the petition, Bowes $3,000 
to S who has a valid lien on property of B worth $3,000. B owns 
$5,000 of other nonexempt property but owes other creditors 
$9,000. Assuming that $1,000 of $9,000 of other claims is enti-
tled to section 64 priority, a general creditor with a $3,000 claim 
will only receive $1 500. 5,ooo-1,ooo x 3,ooo 3 000]. S's $3 000 
' 9,000-1,000 ' ' 
claim, however, will be completely satisfied; S will receive the 
value of the property subject to the lien. 
The debtor rehabilitation provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act differ from straight bankruptcy in that the debtor looks to 
rehabilitation and reorganization, rather than liquidation, and 
the creditors look to future earnings of the bankrupt, rather 
than property held by the 1bankrupt at the time of the institu-
tion of the bankruptcy proceeding to satisfy their claims. There 
9. "The ultimate test of the protection afforded a secured creditor is: will it hold 
up against the trustee in bankruptcy." J. MURRAY & T. WHITE, COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS PROBLEM TEACHING MATERIALS 179 (1973). 
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are several different types of debtor relief cases, each governed 
by separate and distinct chapters of the Bankruptcy Act: reorg-
anization of railroads under section 77; municipal debt compo-
sition under Chapter IX; corporate reorganizations under 
Chapter X; business arrangements under Chapter XII; and 
wage earner plans under Chapter XIII. In the rehabilitation 
proceedings as in straight bankruptcy, the rights and remedies 
of a creditor with a valid lien are substantially greater than 
those of an unsecured creditor. 10 
As the preceding paragraphs imply, some liens that are 
valid outside of bankruptcy are not valid in bankruptcy. While 
invalidation of liens benefits primarily the creditors without 
liens, general creditors are not permitted to challenge the valid-
ity ofliens themselves. The trustee in bankruptcy, however, as 
representative of the creditors is given a variety of powers to 
avoid or supersede prebankruptcy "transfers," as defined in 
section 1(30), that give rise to liens. 
This does not mean that the trustee will be able to avoid 
every lien so that in bankruptcy all creditors will be general 
creditors and thus be treated equally. Perhaps the Act could 
have so provided; perhaps the Act should have so provided. 
But, it did not. Instead it provides the trustee with certain 
powers under sections 60, 67a, 67c, 67d, 70c and 70e to attack 
the liens of creditors. Recordation plays an important part in 
at least three 9f these provisions:/ sections 70c, 60, and 67d. 11 
A. Section 70c 
Sectioh 70c provides in pertinent part: "the trustee shall 
have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of: . . . 
a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by 
legal or equitable proceedings upon all property . . . whether 
10. See generally F.Kennedy, Secured Creditors: The Impact of Bankruptcy on 
Their Interests, in ICLE, BASIC BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVES, PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISCHARGES 155, 172-183 (1971). 
11. It would seem that recordation also plays an important part in lien invalida-
tion under§ 70e. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 445-47 (1973); 
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L.REv. 631, 656-
63 (1972). Professor Kennedy strongly disagrees; see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 M1ctt.L.REv. 
1419 (1967). The Commission's Bill reflects Professor Kennedy's position, § 4-604(b). 
Because of this and because present § 70c is virtually never invoked in a recordation 
situation, this article will not discuss § 70e. 
74 SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
or not such a creditor exists." Section 70c does not describe the 
rights and powers of this hypothetical judicial lien creditor. 
Rather, to determine the rights and powers of such a creditor 
it is necessary to look to non-bankruptcy state law. The state 
law generally "looked to" is the applicable recording statute. 
Every state has statutory recording requirements for transfers 
of realty and security transfers of personalty. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the application of 
section 70c. On January 1, 1975, B gives Ma mortgage on B's 
non-exempt real property. Before M can record the mortgage, 
B on February 2, 1975, files a voluntary bankruptcy. Under 
applicable state law, a mortgage is not effective against judge-
ment lien creditors until recorded. Since M had not recorded 
the mortgage, as of the date of bankruptcy, a creditor who 
obtained a judicial lien on the date of bankruptcy could invali-
date M's mortgage. Section 70c gives the bankruptcy trustee 
the status, i.e., the rights and powers, of a creditor who obtains 
a judicial lien as of the date of bankruptcy. Accordingly, the 
trustee could invalidate M's mortgage under 70c. 
Statutory recording requirements for transfers of realty 
vary greatly from state to state. The variables include (1) the 
type of document to be filed, (2) place of filing, (3) geographical 
extent of the filing unit, and (4) persons protec.ted by the filing 
requirement. 12 For purposes of bankruptcy law, it is the final 
variable that is the most significant. For the bankruptcy trus-
tee to be able to void an unrecorded transfer of realty under 
section 70c, the protection of the applicable recording statute 
must extend to judicial lien creditors. For the bankruptcy trus-
tee to be able to void an unrecorded transfer of realty under 
section 70e, an actual, existing creditor must be within the 
coverage of the applicable recording statute. 
In approximately one third of the states, real property re-
cording statutes expressly limit their protection to bona fide 
purchasers.13 The courts in such states have uniformly ex-
cluded creditors from the protection of the act. In most other 
states, the recording statutes purport to protect all third par-
ties from unrecorded transfers of realty. In some jurisdictions 
12. See generally Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 M1rn.L.REv. 405 
(1922). 
13. See generally G.OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, § 210 (2d ed. 1970) 
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with such a statute, however, courts have limited "third per-
sons" to bona fide purchasers. 14 Where the real property record-
ing statute protects only purchasers, the trustee will not be able 
to avoid an unrecorded transfer of realty under 70c. Section 70c 
does not give the trustee the status of a purchaser. 
Thus, the effect in bankruptcy of a failure to record a real 
property mortgage will vary from state to state. In states with 
real property recording statutes that protect lien creditors the 
mortgage will be invalid under 70c; in states with real property 
recording statutes that protect only bona fide purchasers the 
mortgage will not be vulnerable to a section 70c attack. 
Recording statutes governing security transfers of person-
alty do not present the same uniformity problem. In every state 
except Louisiana security transfers of personalty are governed 
by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 However, a 
famous (or perhaps "infamous") circuit court decision has re-
sulted in one section 70c for the Ninth Circuit and another for 
the rest of the United States. The case is Pacific Finance Corp. 
u. Edwards. 16 There X, on November 12, 1959, recorded a con-
ditional sales contract executed on October 10th. Subse-
quently, a bankruptcy petition was filed. The applicable re-
cording statute provided that a conditional sales contract was 
void as to subsequent creditors if not recorded within ten days 
of execution. Under these facts, it would seem that the trustee 
in bankruptcy could invalidate X's consensual lien. The lien 
would be invalid as to any subsequent creditor and under 70c 
the trustee has the status of a subsequent creditor-i. e., a cred-
itor who extended credit to the bankrupt as of the date of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Ninth Circuit found oth-
erwise: it held that the avoidance under section 70c is depen-
dent upon the existence of an actual subsequent creditor and 
that since there were no such actual creditors the trustee could 
not successfully invoke section 70c. 
14. See generally Note, Status of Judgment Creditors Under the Recording Acts, 
32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 471 (1971). 
15. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, filing, i.e., recordation, is 
the most common method of perfecting, i.e., giving public notice of the lien. It is not, 
however, the only method. Some security interests are perfected by the secured party 
taking possession of the collateral; some are automatically perfected. See UCC 9-302; 
see generally Ruud, The Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code - How? Where? When? How Often? 44 TEXAS L. R. 724 (1966). 
16. 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962). 
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Section 70c has long provided that the trustee has the 
status of a creditor with a judicial lien "whether or not such a 
creditor exists." A number of commentators have focused on 
this language in criticizing Pacific Finance.11 The Pacific 
Finance court reconciled this language with its holding by 
stressing the word "such." The opinion takes the position that 
section 70c does not require the existence of an actual subse-
quent creditor with a judicial lien-of such a creditor-but that 
it does require the existence of an actual subsequent credi-
tor-of a creditor. In other words, the Pacific Finance view is 
that the trustee under 70c cannot hypothesize the existence of 
a subsequent creditor, but if, under the applicable recording 
statute only subsequent lien creditors can invalidate the lien 
in question and there is an actual subsequent general creditor, 
the trustee can hypothesize the necessary lien. 
The present status of Pacific Finance is somewhat unclear. 
It remains the law in the Ninth Circuit. No other circuit has 
expressly accepted or directly rejected Pacific Finance. 
The state to state variations in application are not the only 
troublesome aspect of present section 70c. Generally, section 
70c can invalidate a lien only where there has been a failure to 
record. Absent a recording statute similar to the one involved 
in the Pacific Finance case - a recording statu.te that provides 
that a transfer not filed within a specific time period is ineffec-
tive - section 70c cannot be used to attack delays in filing. 
Reconsider the hypothetical on page 74. Assume that M 
delayed in recording her mortgage until December 12, 1975. If 
B did not file for bankruptcy until December 13, 1975, M's 
mortgage will be valid. Does this make sense? 
In the original version of the hypothetical, a delay in recor-
dation of little more than a month resulted in invalidation of 
M's mortgage; in the amended fact statement, a delay of recor-
dation of almost a year did not affect M's rights. Shouldn't the 
validity of M's mortgage turn on how long M delayed in record-
ing rather than on whether M recorded before the bankruptcy 
petition was filed? At the very least, it seems that a delay in 
recordation should be a significant factor in determining the 
17. E.g., King, Pacific Finance Corp. u. Edwards: Another Misreading of Section 
70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 232 (1963). 
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validity of a lien in bankruptcy. While recordation delay, as 
contrasted with recordation failure, is not significant under 
section 70c, it is in section 60 and section 67d. 
B. Section 60 
At first glance, section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act does not 
seem to have any connection with recordation requirements. 
Professor Charles Seligson, the leading expert on bankruptcy 
law, explained the rationale of section 60 as follows: 
"A cornerstone of the ban~ruptcy structure is the 
principle that equal tr~atment for those similarly sit-
uated must be achieved. It would be highly inequita-
ble to disregard what transpires prior to the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition; to do so would encourage a 
race among creditors, engender favoritism by the 
debtor, and result in inequality of distribution. At 
bankruptcy, the bankrupt would be left, aS' Collier 
says, with only tag ends and remnants of unencum-
bered assets. Therefore, Congress arbitrarily pre-
scribed the four-month period preceding the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition as the period in which prefer-
ential transfers shall be prohibited. However, in order 
to give some measure of security to those dealing with 
the bankrupt who are unaware, actually or construc-
tively, of the bankrupt's insolvency, Congress has 
provided that preferential transfers may not be 
avoided unless the creditor receiving the preference 
had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt 
was insolvent."18 
Seligson's statement suggests that section 60 is quite dif-
ferent from section 70c: 70c promotes perfection of security 
interests; section 60 promotes equality of distribution. How-
ever, a closer examination of section 60, particularly 60a(2}, 
reveals a considerable overlap between the purposes and par-
ticulars of sections 60 and 70c-reveals that recordation affects 
the trustee's avoidance powers under section 60 as well as 
under section 70c. 
There are eight elements of a section 60 preference-
elements easily discernible from reading section 60a(l): 
18. Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 292 (1967). 
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(1) a transfer [broadly defined in section 1(30) to include 
both absolute transfers and security transfers]; 
tion; 
(2) of the bankrupt's non-exempt property; 
(3) made or suffered by the bankrupt; 
(4) within four months of the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
(5) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(6) for or on account of an antecedent debt; 
(7) while the debtor was insolvent; 
(8) the effect of which must be to enable the transferee 
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other 
creditors of the same class. 
The first, second, third and fifth requirements of section 
60a(l) seem easy to apply. The eighth element of a preference 
under 60a(l) presents the most difficulty in understanding and 
application. It requires determination of (1) what is a "class" 
of creditors; (2) whether other creditors are in the same class 
as the transferee; and (3) whether the transfer enables the 
transferee to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than these 
other creditors. For purposes of this article, it is assumed that 
the eighth element is satisfied by any transfer of security ex-
cept a transfer of security to a creditor who is already com-
pletely secured. 19 
19. The most commonly cited judicial discussion of the concept of class in § 60 is 
that appearing in Swarts v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 117 F. 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1902). The court 
stated that: 
"While, it is true that the bankrupt act does not define the word 
'class,' nor in terms state what creditors are in the same class, it 
creates some classes and specifies others, and it seems to us that 
the meaning of the word 'class' in the act should, if possible, be 
derived from the statute itself. Section 64 ... creates ... classes 
of creditors ... entitled to priority. Sections 56b, 57e and 57h 
provide for the treatment and disposition of claims secured by 
property and of claims which have priority. The creditors who hold 
these various claims and the general creditors of the estate consti-
tute the classes of creditors of which the bankrupt act treats. Now 
if any one of these various classes is taken by itself and examined, 
it will be seen that each one of the creditors in the same class 
always receives the same percentage upon his claim, out of the 
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The following hypothetical illustrates the application of 
these eight elements of section 60a(l) in a lien invalidation 
context. On January 1, 1975, D borrows $1,000 from S. S does 
not then obtain any security for her loan. On May 5, 1975, S 
learns that D is in financial difficulty and demands payment 
or assurance of payment. Accordingly, D gives S a lien on 
machinery. On June 6, 1975, D files a voluntary bankruptcy 
petition. The May 5, 1975, transfer of a lien by D to S would 
be a section 60 preference. There was (1) a transfer (2) of the 
bankrupt's non-exempt property (3) by the bankrupt (4) within 
4 months of bankruptcy (5) to a creditor (6) for an antecedent 
debt (7) while the debtor was insolvent (8) which preferred the 
transferee over others in the transferee's class. Section 60b pro-
vides that the trustee can invalidate a preference if the trans-
feree has "at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable 
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." 
In applying the fourth, sixth and seventh requirements of 
section 60a(l) and 60b, it is necessary to know the date of the 
transfer in question. The date of the transfer is not always easy 
to determine. Section 60a(2) provides that a transfer shall be 
deemed to have been made or suffered only when perfected as 
against certain specified other parties. If the transfer is of 
realty, the relevant "other parties" are subsequent bona fide 
purchasers; if the transfer is one of personalty, the "other par-
ties" are subsequent judicial lien creditors. 
Certain transfers are perfected against "other parties" as 
soon as made. Cash payments to a creditor or actual deliveries 
of tangible personal property are deemed to have been made 
when they were actually made because they are then perfected 
as against subsequent liens obtained by judicial proceedings. 
Other transfers such as real property conveyances, mortgages, 
and security transfers of personal property are ordinarily not 
perfected as against "other parties" until some further step 
such as filing or recording has been taken. In other words, state 
estate of the bankrupt, that every other creditor of his class re-
ceives .... The test of classification is the percentage paid upon 
the claims out of the estate of the bankrupt." 
See generally Note, Class-The Forgotten Element of Section 60a (1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 Amz. L. REV. 362 (1969). In this focus, it would seem that a transfer of 
a lien to an unsecured creditor will have a preferential effect unless the bankruptcy 
estate is sufficiently large as to permit 100% payments to all creditors. 
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recording statutes determine when lien transfers are deemed 
made. Thus, recordation is an important part of section 60 lien 
invalidatiom. 
The following hypothetical points up the importance of 
recordation in section 60 contests. B, a Texas debtor, borrows 
$100,000 from S, an Arkansas lender, on February 7, 1975, giv-
ing S a security interest in equipment in Texas. S does not 
perfect this security interest until March 6, 1975. B files a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition on July 1, 1975. At first, it might 
seem that section 60 is not applicable-that the security trans-
fer from B to S was not for an antecedent indebtedness and did 
not occur within four months of the bankruptcy. For purposes 
of section 60, however, the transfer will be deemed made on 
March 6, 1975, not February 7, 1975. Under Section 9-301(1)(b) 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, S's security interest would 
not be perfected as against subsequent judicial lien creditors 
until that date. Accordingly, by reason of section 60a(2), the 
transfer will not be deemed made until that date. Thus, the 
transfer would be within four months of the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition. Thus, the transfer would be for an antecedent 
indebtedness, i.e., the $100,000 loaned on February 7, 1975, 
almost a month prior to the time that the transfer was deemed 
made. 
The above hypothetical illustrates the section 60 signifi-
cance of timely perfection of liens. A delay in perfection can 
result in a transfer actually made for present consideration 
being deemed made for an antecedent indebtedness and thus 
a section 60 preference. From the language of 60a(2), it would 
seem that any delay in perfection-regardless of how slight-
could have this effect. Section 60a(7), however, tempers 
section 60a(2). 
Section 60a(7) is essentially a grace period provision. It 
provides that a transfer is regarded as having occurred on the 
actual date of the transfer if the transferee perfects it in the 
manner required by state law (1) within twenty-one days or (2) 
sooner, if the state law requires. The grace period afforded by 
section 60a(7) to transfers in fact made for new consideration 
is twenty-one days, unless state law provides a shorter grace 
period; the twenty-one day period is the maximum allowable 
even if the state law allows more. 
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Section 60a(7) is applicable only if the transfer of security 
is in fact made "on account of a new and contemporaneous 
consideration." In other words, the lien must be given at the 
time that the debt is incurred. To illustrate, section 60a(7) 
would be applicable to a security interest given on February 7, 
1975, to secure a debt incurred on February 7, 1975. It would, 
however, not be applicable if the February 7, 1975, transfer of 
a security interest was to secure a debt incurred prior to 
February 7, 197 4. 
In summary, the date of recordation can be an important 
factor in determining whether a lien is invalid as a section 60 
preference. Two different types of transfers of liens would seem 
to be section 60 preferences: (1) a lien actually given for an 
antecedent debt and (2) a lien actually given for new considera-
tion that is not timely recorded. 
C. Section 67d 
Section 67d, like section 60, does not appear to have any 
connection with recordation. Section 67d is a fraudulent con-
veyance provision. It is very similar to the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act (hereafter referred to as the UFCA). 20 
Section 67d(l) is a definitional provision and corresponds 
to sections 1, 2 and 3 of the UFCA. Section 67d(2) telescopes 
into one exceedingly long and complex sentence sections 4 
through 7 of the UFCA; if the debtor within one year of bank-
ruptcy made a transfer without fair consideration while insol-
vent, or if he is rendered insolvent thereby, or if the transfer is 
made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud existing or future 
creditors, or is made without fair consideration while the 
debtor is engaged in business and is left thereby without rea-
sonable capital to conduct the business, without regard to in-
tent, or is made without fair consideration by a debtor who 
expects to incur obligations beyond his ability to pay as they 
mature, such transfer is fraudulent. Section 67d(4) is similar 
to the partnership provisions of section 8 of the UFCA. Section 
67d(5) affords bona fide purchasers the same protection as 
UFCA section 9. 
20. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted in twenty-three states, is 
set out volume 7 of the Uniform Laws Annotated. 
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While fraudulent conveyances are generally absolute 
transfers, the creation of a lien can be a fraudulent 
conveyance.21 For example D, unable to pay his debts and con-
cerned that his creditors will institute legal proceedings to seize 
his property, gives, F, his father a mortgage on all of his prop-
erty. Shortly thereafter, the creditors of D file an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustee would be able to 
invalidate the transfer of the mortgage from D to Fas a fraudu-
lent conveyance. When D made the transfer, D was insolvent 
and did not receive fair consideration. When D made the trans-
fer, D intended to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. 
The time of transfer is of course important in section 67d. 
The solvency of the debtor is measured as of the time of the 
transfer. The transfer must have occurred within 1 year of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 22 In section 67d, as in section 
60, the important time is not the date that the transfer actually 
occurred but rather the date that the transfer is deemed to have 
occurred. 
Section 67d(5) fixes the time that a transfer is deemed 
made: when the transfer has been so far perfected that no bona 
fide purchaser from the debtor can thereafter acquire any 
rights superior to those of the transferee in the property. Sec-
tion 67d(5) also provides that if the transfer is not perfected 
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, it will be deemed 
to have been made just before the bankruptcy petition. 
The time of perfection as against a bona fide purchaser is 
important not only for limitation purposes but also as the time 
for determining whether the transfer was fraudulent under ei-
ther 67d(2), (3), or (4). If, for example, the trustee is contending 
that a transfer was fraudulent under either 67d(2) (a) or 67d(4) 
which requires proof of insolvency of the transferor, the trustee 
can satisfy the insolvency requirement by showing insolvency 
of the transferor debtor at the time the transfer became valid 
as against a bona fide purchaser. Thus, again, a lien can be 
invalidated by the bankruptcy trustee because of recordation. 
21. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 
P.2d 550 (1970); In re Rasmussen's Estate, 238 Wis. 334, 298 N.W. 172 (1941). 
22. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2). 
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Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 23 is the classic illustra-
tion of the application of section 67d(5). There the debtor made 
a gift of real estate to her brother. At the time of the gift, the 
debtor had no financial problems. The debtor, however, subse-
quently became involved in an automobile accident which re-
sulted in litigation against her. During the litigation, debtor's 
brother finally recorded the deed pursuant to state law. There-
after, the person injured by debtor recovered a $15,000 judg-
ment which debtor was unable to pay. The debtor filed a volun-
tary bankruptcy petition. Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee 
invalidated the gift of real estate to her brother under section 
67d. 
Note that the recordation or rather the delay in recorda-
tion was crucial to the bankruptcy trustee's section 67d case. 
At the time that the gift was actually made, the debtor was 
solvent. There are no legal problems with people who are sol-
vent making gifts. It happens every Christmas and Chanukah. 
Gifts are fraudulent conveyances only when made by insol-
vents. 
While the debtor in Kindom was solvent when the gift was 
actually made, she was not solvent when the gift was "deemed" 
made. Since the transfer was not by state law perfected against 
bona fide purchasers until recordation, the trustee was allowed 
to invoke section 67d although the actual transfer occurred 
almost two years before bankruptcy. And, since the transfer 
was deemed made during the lawsuit, it was held fraudulent 
under section 67d(2)(c) as one made without fair consideration 
"by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur 
debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature. In so holding, 
the court stated: 
"Since the time of the transfer was [deemed to be] 
during the trial of a claim against her, large in 
amount as tested by her income, and since she was 
already indebted to her brother [for $900) and 
[was] responsible for supporting herself and her 
daughter, the deduction is inescapable that at that 
time she contemplated incurring liabilities which she 
could not discharge as they matured."2' 
23. 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959). 
24. 269 F.2d at 107. 
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Section 67d can thus be summarized in much the same 
way as section 60 was. Two separate and distinct kinds of 
transfers are affected by section 67d: (1) true fraudulent con-
veyances, e.g., gifts by insolvents, transfers made with an in-
tent to defraud creditors and (2) "technical" fraudulent con-
veyances, i.e., transfers "valid" when actually "made" that are 
not timely recorded. 
II. COMMISSION'S BILL AND JUDGES' BILL 
Both the Commission's Bill and the Judges' Bill represent 
a substantial departure from present bankruptcy law and prac-
tice. 25 While the most drastic changes are in the general areas 
of bankruptcy administration, consumer relief and business 
rehabilitation, changes have been proposed in the various lien 
invalidation provisions. These changes do not, however, change 
the basic role of recordation in bankruptcy lien invalidation. 
A. Section 4-604( a) 
Section 4-604(a) of both the Commission's Bill and the 
Judges' Bill correspond to section 70c of the present Bank-
ruptcy Act. The two versions of section 4-604(a) are virtually 
identical to each other. The two versions of section 4-604(a) are 
virtually identical to section 70c. 
The trustee has the "rights and powers of a judicial lien 
creditor" as of the date of bankruptcy. Such rights and powers 
are determined by state law, primarily state recording statutes. 
If such statutes protect lien creditors, the bankruptcy trustee 
will be able to invalidate liens that are not recorded as of the 
date of bankruptcy. However, even if such statutes do protect 
lien creditors, the bankruptcy trustee will generally not be able 
to invalidate liens recorded prior to bankruptcy, but after a 
considerable delay. 
B. Section 4-607 
Section 4-607 in both bills is designed to replace section 
25. There have already been several Jaw review articles that survey the two bills. 
See e.g., Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for 
the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM.BANKR.L.J.1 (1975); Walker, An Intro-
duction to the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: From Revision to Revolution, 41 
TENN.L.REv. 635 (1975). 
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60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Both proposals substantially 
change the present law of preferences. Both bills define a 
preference as a transfer made while the debtor was insolvent 
to pay or secure an antecedent debt. The Commission's Bill 
shortens the four month period of the present Act to three 
months for preferences to creditors other than "insiders."26 
The Judges' Bill retains the traditional four month period.27 
Under both bills, preferential transfers to "insiders" - e.g., a 
member of the debtor's immediate family, officer, director, 
partner, or managing agent of the debtor - within one year 
of the filing of the petition can be avoided. 28 
The most difficult problems of proof under the present 
version of section 60 are (1) insolvency at the time of transfer 
and (2) reasonable cause by the transferee to believe that the 
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 29 Both bills 
ameliorate these problems of proof. Under both bills, insol-
vency of the debtor is presumed for the initial preference period 
(i.e., three months under the Commission's Bill, four months 
under the Judges' Bill).30 Similarly for this period, both bills 
eliminate the requirement of proof of reasonable cause to be-
lieve. 31 The Judges' Bill also shifts the burden on insolvency 
and eliminates reasonable cause to believe as to preferential 
transfers to insiders during the earliest eight (8) months one 
year prior to bankruptcy;32 the Commission's Bill does not. 
These proposed changes in proof of insolvency and "rea-
sonable cause to believe" will make it much easier for bank-
ruptcy trustees to invalidate transfers as preferences. Although 
the above-discussed changes do not mention recordation, they 
indirectly affect the role of recordation in bankruptcy lien in-
validation. They increase the likelihood that a delay in recor-
dation will result in a lien being invalidated as a preferential 
transfer. 
26. § 4-607(a)(l) (Commission) 
27. § 4-607(a)(l)(Judges) 
28. § 4-607(a)(2) 
29. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part 
I 204 (July 1973). 
30. § 4-607(f)(Commission); § 4-607(g)(Judges) 
31. § 4-607(a)(l); see generally Note, Voidable Preferences: An Analysis of the 
Proposed Revisions of Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act, 1974 Wisc. L.REv. 481. 
32. § 4-607(a)(2)(Judges) 
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For example, on January 1, 1975, X borrows $1,000 from 
Y and gives Ya mortgage on Green Acre. On February 2, 1975, 
Y records the mortgage in the manner prescribed by state law. 
On March 3, 1975, X files a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 
Under section 60, the trustee will have to establish (1) X was 
insolvent on February 2, 1975, and (2) Y had reasonable cause 
to believe that X was insolvent on February 2, 1975. Under 
section 4-607 of the Commission's Bill or the Judges' Bill, the 
trustee will not have to prove either.33 
There are some provisions in both bills that more directly 
speak to recordation. 
"A transfer of real property other than fixtures, 
but including the interest of a seller or purchaser 
under a contract for the sale of real property, is per-
fected when the transferee has acquired an interest in 
the property which is superior to the rights a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser of the property from the 
transferor could subsequently acquire by his pur-
chase. A transfer of fixtures or of property other than 
real property is perfected when the transferee has 
acquired an interest in the property which is superior 
to the rights a subsequent judicial lien creditor could 
acquire in the property transferred. 
"A transfer occurs when it takes effect between 
the parties if perfected at that time or within ten days 
thereafter. If perfected after the ten days, the transfer 
occurs when perfection occurs. Unless perfected 
within ten days, a transfer not perfected before the 
filing of the petition dates from a time immediately 
preceding such filing. A transfer does not take effect 
before the transferor has acquired rights in the prop-
erty. "3~ 
The first quoted paragraph corresponds to section 60a(2) 
of the present act: using the bona fide purchaser standard for 
transfers of real property and the judicial lien creditor test for 
transfers of personalty. The second paragraph set out above 
replaces section 60a(7). It substitutes a fixed ten-day grace 
period for the twenty-one day maximum grace period of section 
60a(7). 
33. To be precise, the trustee will have to establish insolvency but there is a 
statutory presumption of insolvency. 
34. § 4-607(g)(6)&(7)(Commission); § 4-607(i)(Judges) 
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Again, the effect of the proposals can best be understood 
by illustration. On January 1, 1975, D borrows $1,000 from S 
and gives Sa security interest on her car.35 S neglects to record 
its security interest until January 20, 1975. Under section 
60(a)(7)'s 21-day grace period, the transfer of the security inter-
est will be deemed to have occurred on January 1, 1975. No 
antecedent debt. No preference. 
Under section 4-607's 10-day grace period, the transfer of 
the security interest will be deemed to have occurred on Janu-
ary 20, 1975. The Commission's Bill defines "antecedent debt" 
as "a debt incurred more than five days before a transfer pay-
ing or securing a debt." 36 Accordingly, applying the Commis-
sion version of section 4-607 to the hypothetical, there would 
be "antecedent debt" and the 19-day delay in recordation 
would result in invalidation of the security interest as a 
preference. The Judges' Bill defines "antecedent debt" as "a 
debt incurred more than thirty days before a transfer paying 
or securing a debt."37 Applying the Judges' section 4-607 to the 
hypothetical, no antecedent debt and thus no preference. 
In this focus, the proposed bills do not change the role of 
recordation in invalidation of liens as preferences. All that is 
to be changed is the time period that a creditor can delay 
recordatiori without risking lien invalidation.38 
C. Section 4-608 of the Commission's Bill and Section 4-609 
of the Judges' Bill 
Section 4-608 of the Commission's Bill and section 4-609 
of the Judges' Bill are the primary fraudulent conveyance pro-
visions in the proposed acts. Notwithstanding the difference in 
numbering, the two are basically similar to each other. 39 The 
35. In most states, recordation of a lien on an automobile is accomplished by 
notation of the lien on the certificate of title. See UCC 9-302(3); see generally Murphey, 
Cars, Creditors and the Code, 1970 WASH.U.L.Q. 135. 
36. § 4-607(g)(l)(Commission) 
37. § 4-607(h)(l)(Judges) 
38. Reading § 4-607(i) together with § 4-607(h)(l), it seems that the Judges' Bill 
is providing for what amounts to a 30-day grace period. If there is a 29-day delay in 
recordation, the transfer will be deemed to have occurred on the date of recordation 
rather than the date of the actual transfer. Nevertheless, the trustee would not be able 
to invalidate the transfer because of the 30-day gap permitted by the definition of 
antecedent debt. 
39. See generally Countryman, Some Good and Some Bad Features of the Pro-
posed New Bankruptcy Act, UCC L.J. 213, 228-29 (1975). 
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two proposals are also basically similar to section 67 d of the 
existing Act. While there are differences between the two provi-
sions and present law, the role of recordation remains the same. 
"A transfer occurs at the time when it becomes 
so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the 
debtor other than a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business could thereafter have acquired any rights in 
the property transferred superior to the rights of the 
transferee therein, but if the transfer is not so per-
fected prior to the date of the petition under this title, 
it occurs immediately before the date of the peti-
tion." 
Accordingly, under the proposed legislation as under the 
present law, a transfer that is not a fraudulent conveyance, 
viewed as of the date it is actually made, can be invalidated 
as a fraudulent conveyance because of a delay in recordation 
and a change in the debtor's financial situation. 
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
Under both the present bankruptcy act and the two pro-
posals that Congress is currently considering, recordation is a 
factor in lien invalidation. Under both the present bankruptcy 
act and the two proposals, the failure to record will result in 
loss of lien status if the applicable recording statute protects 
lien creditors. That is the effect of section 70c and proposed 
section 4-604. The result is less clear if the applicable recording 
statute only protects bona fide purchasers. Invalidation then 
hinges on the trustee's satisfying the various requirements of 
the preference or fraudulent conveyance provision. Similarly, 
invalidation of a lien because of a delay in recordation turns on 
proof of a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. 
It is submitted that a failure to record or a delay in record-
ing should be a factor in determining the validity of a lien. 
Such inaction on the part of a lien creditor can prejudice other 
creditors. If creditor X does not record its lien, creditor Y might 
not know that the debtor's property is encumbered; relying on 
the mistaken belief that the debtor holds his or her property 
free from liens, Y might extend credit or refrain from obtaining 
a lien or instituting collection proceedings. 
Just as there is a bankruptcy policy against preferences 
and fraudulent conveyances there should be a bankruptcy pol-
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icy against recordation delays and failures. And, this policy 
should be manifested in the same fashion as the policy against 
preferences and fraudulent conveyances: a separate section of 
the Bankruptcy Act setting specific recordation standards. 
Instead of the present and proposed piecemeal treatment of 
recordation problems, the Bankruptcy Act should simply pro-
vide that consensual liens that are not recorded or otherwise 
perfected within ten days40 of their creation shall be invalid in 
bankruptcy.41 
The following chart shows the impact of this proposal. 
40. There is nothing "magical" about ten days. This number was selected because 
it was used by the Commission in § 4-607(h)(2) and because it appears throughout the 
time requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., 2-702(2); 9-301(2). 
41. Others earlier recognized the problems presented by the piecemeal treatment 
of recordation in the present Bankruptcy Act. For example, in 1970, Professor Robert 
Morris of the University of Minnesota called for changing the law of preferences so that 
delay in recordation would not result in technical preferences. See Morris, Bankruptcy 
Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MINN.L.REv. 737 (1970). 
See also § 4-608 (Commission), note 9. 
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invalid under section 60 invalid under 4-607 
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time of transfer and (2) 
transferee had reasonable 
cause to believe that 
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